The neural systems supporting human intelligence, as measured by lesion analysis, task activation, and resting state connectivity

The set structure of human cognitive abilities and their organization in the brain remains as controversial today as it was when the positive manifold between diverse cognitive tests was first explained as being driven by a single capacity for processing information. Alternative explanatory accounts of human intelligence can interpret the same experimental data in support of their competing claims because they do not make testable predictions. Far from being the reductive caricature of itself that some have parodied, cognitive neuroscience is one subfield of psychology (among others) whose methods lend themselves to the generation of testable predictions about how brain structure and function should relate to psychological test performance if different explanatory frameworks were true. This dissertation will explain three experiments on mapping tests of intelligence in the brain: first, a test of analogical reasoning using task-related functional MRI, followed by a test of emotional intelligence using analysis of focal penetrating brain lesions, followed by a test of visuospatial matrix reasoning, or fluid intelligence, using resting state functional MRI. Finally, a chapter on the literature and theoretical considerations about mapping causal reasoning in the brain will close the current discussion.U of I OnlyAuthor requested U of Illinois access only (OA after 2yrs) in Vireo ETD syste

The neural systems supporting human intelligence, as measured by lesion analysis, task activation, and resting state connectivity

The set structure of human cognitive abilities and their organization in the brain remains as controversial today as it was when the positive manifold between diverse cognitive tests was first explained as being driven by a single capacity for processing information. Alternative explanatory accounts of human intelligence can interpret the same experimental data in support of their competing claims because they do not make testable predictions. Far from being the reductive caricature of itself that some have parodied, cognitive neuroscience is one subfield of psychology (among others) whose methods lend themselves to the generation of testable predictions about how brain structure and function should relate to psychological test performance if different explanatory frameworks were true. This dissertation will explain three experiments on mapping tests of intelligence in the brain: first, a test of analogical reasoning using task-related functional MRI, followed by a test of emotional intelligence using analysis of focal penetrating brain lesions, followed by a test of visuospatial matrix reasoning, or fluid intelligence, using resting state functional MRI. Finally, a chapter on the literature and theoretical considerations about mapping causal reasoning in the brain will close the current discussion.U of I OnlyAuthor requested U of Illinois access only (OA after 2yrs) in Vireo ETD syste

Motivated Explanation

Although motivation is a well-established field of study in its own right, and has been fruitfully studied in connection with attribution theory and belief formation under the heading of motivated thinking, its powerful and pervasive influence on explanatory processes is less well explored. Where one has a strong motivation to understand some event correctly, one is thereby motivated to adhere as best one can to normative or epistemic criteria for correct or accurate explanation, even if one does not consciously formulate or apply such criteria. By contrast, many of our motivations to explain introduce bias into the processes involved in generating, evaluating, or giving of explanations. Non-epistemic explanatory motivations, or (following Kunda’s usage), directional motivations, include self-justification, resolution of cognitive dissonance, deliberate deception, teaching, and many more. Some of these motivations lead to the relaxation or violation of epistemic norms, combined with an effort to preserve the appearance of accuracy; others enhance epistemic motivation, so that one engages in more careful and thorough generational and evaluative processes. In short, real life explanatory processes are often constrained by multiple goals, epistemic and directional, where these goals may mutually reinforce one another or may conflict, and where our explanations emerge as a matter of weighing and satisfying those goals. Our proposals are largely programmatic, although we do review a good deal of relevant behavioral and neurological evidence. Specifically, we recognize five generative processes, some of which cover further sub-processes, and six evaluative processes. All of these are potential points of entry for the influence of motivation. We then suggest in some detail how specific sorts of explanatory motivation interact with specific explanatory processes

Lesion Mapping the Four-Factor Structure of Emotional Intelligence

Emotional intelligence refers to an individual’s ability to process and respond to emotions, including recognizing the expression of emotions in others, using emotions to enhance thought and decision making, and regulating emotions to drive effective behaviors. Despite their importance for goal-directed social behavior, little is known about the neural mechanisms underlying specific facets of emotional intelligence. Here, we report findings from a study investigating the neural bases of these specific components for emotional intelligence in a sample of 130 combat veterans with penetrating traumatic brain injury. We examined the neural mechanisms underlying experiential (perceiving and using emotional information) and strategic (understanding and managing emotions) facets of emotional intelligence. Factor scores were submitted to voxel-based lesion symptom mapping to elucidate their neural substrates. The results indicate that two facets of emotional intelligence (perceiving and managing emotions) engage common and distinctive neural systems, with shared dependence on the social knowledge network, and selective engagement of the orbitofrontal and parietal cortex for strategic aspects of emotional information processing. The observed pattern of findings suggests that sub-facets of experiential and strategic emotional intelligence can be characterized as separable but related processes that depend upon a core network of brain structures within frontal, temporal and parietal cortex